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CUSTOMER SOPHISTICATION AND A PLAINTIFFS DUTY
OF DUE DILIGENCE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR
CHURNING ACTIONS IN NONDISCRETIONARY
ACCOUNTS UNDER SEC RULE 10b-5
INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent broker practices often arise from the conflicting interests of
a broker, who earns commissions based on the dollar amount and
-number of transactions, and a customer, who risks his capital and its
profitability on the quality of the investment decisions.I Churning occurs
when the broker causes the customer's account to be traded excessively
for the purpose of generating commissions.2
To succeed in an action for churning under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)3 and Rule lOb-5,4 the plaintiff
must prove that there was excessive trading, that the broker acted with
scienter and that the broker controlled the account.5
Courts and commentators recognize that there is no single formula for
showing that an account has been traded excessively.6 The standard of
measurement depends on the nature of the account.7 This, in turn, is a
1. See Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1036 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd in relevant part, 570 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978);
1 S. Goldberg, Fraudulent Broker-Dealer Practices XXV (1978); Poser, Options Account
Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 Bus. Law. 571, 573 (1984).
2. Sea e.g., Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 644 (3d Cir. 1985); Hatrock v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1984); Costello v. Oppenheimer &
Co. 711 F.2d 1361, 1367 (7th Cir. 1983).
3. Ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982)). Section 10(b) reads in relevant part, "[ilt shall be unlawful for any per-
son . . . . (b) To use or employ, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
4. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1985), which reads in relevant part, "[it shall be unlawful
for any person. . . . (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .....
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person ...."
5. Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1983); Miley v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co.,
619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
6. Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co., Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1203 (8th Cir.
1982); Booth v. Peavy Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other
grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); 2 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud
& Commodities Fraud § 5.7(322), at 5:82.103 (1985); 1 S. Goldberg, supra note I, § 2.9,
at 2-41; Lowenfels, A Report on Churning Actions Under Federal Securities Lans,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1986, at 18, col. 3.
7. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) ("structure and investment
objectives of an account" relevant to determination of excessive trading). A higher vol-
ume of trading is necessary to support a claim of churning in a trading account, where
the customer's purpose is to realize short term gain on the purchase and sale of securities,
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function of the customer's stated goals, purposes and financial resources.8
Once the nature of the account is determined, the trier of fact examines
the entire course of trading for evidence of excessive volume.9
than in an investment account, where the customer hopes to derive dividend income and
conserve principal. See Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
8. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) (cus-
tomer investment goals are standards against which excessiveness may be measured); Mi-
ley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981) (broker's management of
account analyzed in comparison to needs and desires of investor); Mihara v. Dean Witter
& Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) (volume of trades must be examined in light of
customer's trading objectives); Lang v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 582 F.
Supp. 1421, 1428 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (detection of fraud requires awareness that trading is
excessive in light of dollar value of account and customer's objectives).
9. Single transactions or limited groups of trades do not constitute churning. Miley
v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981). Churning, as a unified offense,
requires hindsight analysis of the broker's management of the account. Id.
One of the factors tending to show excessive trading is the turnover rate. Costello v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1369 (7th Cir. 1983). The turnover rate is the ratio
of the total cost of purchases made over a period of time to the amount invested. This
rate reflects how many times in a given period the securities in a customer's account have
been replaced by new securities. Whether a particular turnover rate is excessive depends
on the customer's objectives. Id. at 1369 n.11. It has been suggested that "an annual
turnover rate of six reflects excessive trading." Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d
814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
Another factor is the frequency of in and out trading. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
711 F.2d 1361, 1369 (7th Cir. 1983). In and out trading occurs when all or part of a
customer's portfolio is sold, and the money is reinvested in other securities that are in
turn sold to finance the purchase of another set of securities. It is difficult for the broker
to justify such a practice. id. at 1369 n.9. It has been suggested that if in and out trading
involves 75% of the portfolio during a six-month period, 50% during a three-month
period, or 25% during a one-month period, it may indicate excessive trading when there
are a sufficient number of transactions to be statistically relevant. See I S. Goldberg,
supra note 1, § 2.9[b][2], at 2-52.
Another factor is the commission ratio. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d
1361, 1369 (7th Cir. 1983). This is the ratio between the broker's commission and the
size of the account. Id. An annual commission ratio approximately 25% of the size of
the investor's equity may indicate excessive trading. See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 6,
§ 5.7(322)(2), at 5:82.108.
Multiple trading is another relevant factor. See R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467,
471, 474 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844
(1956). Multiple trading is a variant of in and out trading in which the broker induces
the customer to buy stock A, to sell it shortly thereafter to obtain the capital to buy stock
B, and then after holding it briefly, to sell stock B and reinvest in stock A. 1 S. Goldberg,
supra note 1, § 2.9[c][1], at 2-62-2-63.
Cross trading is another relevant factor. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d
1361, 1369 (7th Cir. 1983). "'Cross trading' occurs where a broker arranges for transfers
between customers. It is a . . . suspect practice unless the dealer can demonstrate that
the accounts had different purposes and that the particular securities were suitable for
one account but not another." Id. at 1369 n.10.
The frequent purchase of poor quality investments may also indicate excessive trading.
See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D. Va. 1968); 2 A.
Bromberg, supra note 6, § 5.7(322)(4), at 5:82.116 to -17. Poor quality securities include
those rated less than investment grade by Standard and Poor. Id. at 5:82.117 (quoting
Stevens, 288 F. Supp. at 842).
The frequent purchase of unsuitable investments is also relevant. See Twomey v.
[Vol. 541102
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The Supreme Court did not formally impose a scienter requirement'0
on all Rule lOb-5 actions until Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,II although
prior lower court rulings recognized that proof of the broker's purpose
was a necessary element in a churning action.' 2 Some courts, in addition
to imposing the general scienter requirement, have considered evidence
of the broker's motivation in determining whether there has been exces-
sive trading. 3 One court has even indicated that scienter need not al-
Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 718, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 241
(1968) (purchase of unsuitable securities taints dealings and supports finding of churn-
ing); Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 871 (1967) (National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) action against broker for churning based on
repeated purchase of unsuitable investments upheld by Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) [hereinafter cited as Churning]. Unsuitable investments are distinguishable
from poor quality investments because unsuitability is determined by reference to the
particular customer. See Twomey, 262 Cal. App. 2d at 718, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
Another factor considered relevant is the percentage of the broker's total income de-
rived from commissions on the account. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970); R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 474 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956). However, this measure is more relevant to
the issue of broker's motivation than to excessive trading, see 1 S. Goldberg, supra note 1,
§ 2.9[b][3], at 2-55 to -56; cf. Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389,
402 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same measure used as evidence of scienter), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d
Cir. 1977), because it does not measure the volume of trading in the account itself. For a
discussion of the recklessness standard as a basis for Rule lOb-5 liability, see Milich Se-
curities Fraud under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: Scienter, Recklessness and the Good Faith
Defense, 2 J. Corp. L. 179 (1986).
10. Scienter "refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976). Although the
Supreme Court did not address the question whether reckless behavior is sufficient to
create civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-S, see id., some lower courts have recog-
nized that willful or reckless conduct can create liability in a churning action. See, eg.,
Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); M & B Contracting
Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Rolfv. Blyth Eastman Dillon
& Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389,
400 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
11. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
12. See, e.g. Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir.
1970) (pattern of trading used to indicate that broker's purpose was to generate commis-
sions); Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 380 (N.D. Okla. 1975)
(dealer's profits compared with size of customer's account to determine whether broker's
purpose was to generate commissions); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp.
836, 845 (E.D. Va. 1968) (churning involves improper purpose on the part of the broker);
see also E.H. Rollins & Sons Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945) (it must be determined
whether broker induced excessive trading for purpose of obtaining profits for themselves).
13. Compare Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (high percentage of broker total income earned in commissions from
account at issue considered evidence of scienter), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977) with
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (high percentage
of broker's total commissions earned from account at issue is evidence of excessive trad-
ing), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Marshak v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp 377, 380 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (comparision of size of
broker's commission to size of customer's account used to demonstrate excessive trading
with purpose to generate commissions).
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ways be proved separately because it may be implicit in the broker's
conduct. 4 Other circuits have imposed the burden of proving scienter as
a separate element of the claim.15 Commentators have suggested that
this apparent disagreement is based more on form than on substance be-
cause it is difficult for scienter to be absent given the requisite demonstra-
tion of broker control and broker purpose.16 Thus, although some courts
consider the broker's requisite mental state as indicative of excessive
trading,17 these issues generally are more appropriately kept distinct.',
It has been suggested that broker liability is premised on his control of
the account. 9 This control provides the causal connection between the
defendant broker's conduct and the plaintiff's loss.20 Proof of broker
control is necessary for discretionary2 as well as nondiscretionary ac-
counts.22 When the customer has granted the broker the power to trade
without prior authorization, actual control may be proved by reference
14. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) (scienter may be im-
plicit in nature of broker's conduct).
15. See, e.g., Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1983);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter
& Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
16. See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 6, § 5.7(323), at 5:82.119; N. Poser, supra note 1,
at 585 (1984).
17. See supra notes 9, 12-13 and accompanying text.
18. A finding of excessive trading depends on a hindsight analysis of the history of the
account. Thus, no single trade or identifiable series of trades constitutes a "but for" cause
of the offense. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981).
Factors that indicate scienter tend to involve single trades (for example, cross trading, see
supra note 9) small groups of trades (for example, multiple trading, see supra note 9) or
do not refer to the volume of trading in the account (for example, the percentage of the
broker's total income derived from the account at issue, see supra note 9). When factors
that go to determining volume are commingled with those determining purpose, there is a
danger that a broker will be found liable for churning solely on the basis of transactions
that, while indicative of improper motivation, do not prove excessive trading. Only the
commission ratio, see supra note 9, which considers both the total volume of transactions
and the benefit derived by the broker, is appropriate evidence for both issues.
19. See E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945) (dictum) (dealer's culpa-
bility for trading may be found when there is a discretionary grant of authority or when
he occupies such a position with respect to customer that he may be held responsible for
excessive trading); Churning, supra note 9, at 870 ("fact that a customer has given the
dealer control over his account justifies the presumption that he relied on the dealer to act
primarily as an investment counselor, even though he may have been aware to some
degree of the dealer's adverse interest.").
20. See Thomson & McKinnon, 35 S.E.C. 451, 454 (1953) (broker not guilty of over-
trading in accounts when customer controls trading); Churning, supra note 9, at 870
(when customer has given dealer control over account, broker has no justification for
using his control to maximize his profits); see also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d
175, 186 (3d Cir. 1981) (in misrepresentation action under Rule lOb-5 reliance is "one
aspect of the ubiquitous requirement that losses be causally related to the defendant's
wrongful acts"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
21. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1983)
(proof of control required for discretionary account).
22. See Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1982)
(proof of control required for nondiscretionary accounts).
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to the brokerage contract.2 3 Even when the customer retains the author-
ity to approve each transaction-a nondiscretionary account-the broker
will be found liable when he has assumed de facto control of the ac-
count.24 De facto control requires a finding that the broker abused the
customer's trust and confidence by causing excessive trading. 5 It is
based on a determination of whether the customer relied on the broker's
trading recommendations or reached an independent trading decision. 6
When the customer initiates the transactions in the account the broker
generally may not be held liable for churning because he cannot be said
to control the account.2 A customer able to make independent trading
decisions may be termed "sophisticated"2 and may be deemed to retain
control of the account,2 9 even if he may have routinely relied on the bro-
23. See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368-69 (7th Cir. 1983) (bro-
ker control established when customer has granted broker power of attorney).
24. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); 1 S. Goldberg,
supra note 1, § 2.8[a], at 2-24; see also Churning, supra note 9, at 871 (findings that
churning existed were once restricted to discretionary accounts, but this is no longer
true).
25. See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (broker
may have control when he abuses customer confidence), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035
(1978); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (broker
abused trust and confidence and caused excessive trading), modified on othergrounds, 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 485 (1955) (when plaintiff
trusted and had confidence in the defendant, the defendant was obligated to act in his
customer's best interests), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 844 (1956); see also Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir.
1982) (dictum) (discussing factors relevant to finding de facto control).
26. See Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982) (account
may be in broker's control if customer unable to exercise independent trading judgment);
Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1975) (issue is whether customer can
independently evaluate broker's suggestions); Moran v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 609 F.
Supp. 661, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (when a customer has the independent capacity to accept
or reject broker's recommendations, he cannot accuse broker of control); Leib v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 956-57 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (cus-
tomer who independently decides to accept broker's recommendations retains control of
his account); see also Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1983) (customer's routine reliance on broker's recommendations, sophistication as to se-
curities matters and independent evaluations are equal considerations); Newburger, Loeb
& Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1069-70, (2d Cir. 1977) (if customer has capacity to
evaluate his broker's advice and agrees with it, customer controls the account), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
27. See Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co., Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1203 (8th
Cir. 1982) (churning cannot occur as to any trade directed by customer); E.H. Rollins &
Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 345, 350 (1945) (dealer not responsible for overtrading when trans-
actions are initiated by investor). But see Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th
Cir. 1974) (even trades initiated by the customer may indicate churning where a relation-
ship of trust and confidence vests control in the broker).
28. See Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983); Cos-
tello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 n.8 (7th Cir. 1983); Follansbee v. Davis,
Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1982).
29. See Yopp v. Siegel Trading Co., 770 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1985) (sophisticated
investor retains control of his account), withdrawn from publication on other grounds
(available Apr. 28, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file); Carras v. Burns, 516
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ker's recommendations. 30 A customer unable to reach an independent,
informed decision may be termed "naive" and de facto control may be
found.31
The courts' characterization of customers holding nondiscretionary
accounts as sophisticated or naive has been inconsistent 32 and confusing.
One explanation for this inconsistency is that the distinction between the
naive and sophisticated customer is a means for justifying a decision
rather than a functional rule of law. 3 Although the inquiry into the
customer's actual reliance on the broker focuses on whether the customer
was actually influenced in his investment decisions by the broker's ac-
tions,34 the focus of the inquiry into customer sophistication is whether
the customer should have been influenced by them. 5 Thus, the inquiry
F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (finding that customer has competance to manage
account ordinarily disposes of churning claim).
30. See Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982).
31. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[1]ack of competance itself
may give rise to an inference of [broker] control"); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 417, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (reliance on broker's recommendations may prove con-
trol, especially when customer is relatively naive and unsophisticated), modified on other
grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. Compare Shorrock v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,251, at 92,676 (D. Or. 1977) (customer
who routinely relied on broker's recommendations and who possessed intelligence and
good judgment, but lacked business experience, found in control of account) with Mihara
v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) (customer who routinely
relied on broker's recommendations and who had master's degree in engineering and ten
years investment experience found not to be in control of account). Although the Ninth
Circuit in Mihara based its holding on the principle that routine reliance suffices to prove
broker control, see id. at 821, the court later explained this holding as a shorthand form
of the concept that routine reliance suffices to prove control when the customer is rela-
tively naive and unsophisticated, Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677
(9th Cir. 1982).
33. See Churning, supra note 9, at 872.
34. See Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 328 n. 10 (1948) (churning can be found in nondiscre-
tionary accounts when, "by reason of the trust and reliance of the customer," broker can
"dictate or influence the timing and frequency of the transactions"); Wheeler, Plaintiff's
Duty of Due Care Under Rule l0b-5: An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 561, 592-93 (1975) (distinguishing actual reliance requirement from duty of
due care for lob-5 actions alleging omission or misrepresentation).
35. The touchstone of the sophistication inquiry "is whether or not the customer has
sufficient intelligence and understanding to evaluate the broker's recommendations" and
to reject them when he finds them inappropriate. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681
F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982); see Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 648-49 (3d Cir.
1985) (citing Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677). However, as a result of the broker's greater
access to financial information and research and support facilities, even the sophisticated
customer who seeks advice from the broker is expected to rely on those recommendations
or disassociate himself from the broker. See Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677.
If the sophisticated customer is actively monitoring his account, he probably will be
found to be in control of it. See Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1983) (sophisticated customer who monitors account and doesn't disagree with
broker retains control). Because the pattern of trading must indicate a purpose to benefit
the broker by generating excessive commissions, see Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711
F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983), see supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text, it is un-
likely that the sophisticated investor would intend to trade in a manner that is not merely
1106 [Vol. 54
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into customer sophistication is really an equivalent of the Rule lOb-5
requirement that the customer exercise good judgment and due care in
order to recover damages.3 6 This requirement is termed due diligence.37
Due diligence requires a plaintiff to take reasonable steps to safeguard
his interests and to exercise good judgment in making investment deci-
sions. A plaintiff who has not exercised due diligence will not be eligible
to recover money damages.38 Courts disagree both on the standard of
unprofitable, but also against his interest. See supra note I and accompanying text. It
can be inferred then, that the inquiry into customer sophistication is premised on denying
recovery to plaintiffs who have the capacity to manage their affairs but do not show good
judgment and due care in doing so.
At least one court has recognized that recovery for churning should be denied if the
customer is insufficiently careful in the supervision of his account. See Petrites v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum) (reckless plaintiff not
allowed to recover under Rule lOb-5).
36. The equivalence of the rule denying recovery to sophisticated plaintiffs in a churn-
ing action and the rule denying recovery to a plaintiff who fails to exercise due diligence is
underscored by the standards used by courts when applying these rules. In M & B Con-
tracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Mich. 1984), the court indicated that
indicia of control for purposes of a churning action include:
1) the identity, age, education, intelligence, and investment and business experi-
ence of the customer; 2) the relationship between the customer and the account
executive, that is, whether it is an arms-length one or a particularly close rela-
tionship; 3) knowledge of the market and the account; 4) the regularity of dis-
cussions between the account executive and the customer;, 5) whether the
customer actually authorized each trade; and 6) who made the recommenda-
tions for trades.
Id. at 1111. Similarly, in Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983), the
court indicated that the relevant factors to determine whether plaintiff's reliance was
reasonable include:
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities
matters; (2) the existence of long standing business or personal relationships; (3)
access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship;
(5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud; (7)
whether the plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the
transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations.
Id. at 1516.
37. See Comment, A Reevaluation of the Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs in
Private Actions Under SEC Rule lob-5, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 904, 904 (due diligence re-
quires plaintif to show good judgment and due care in his affairs) [hereinafter cited as
Diligence].
Due diligence is synonymous with both the duty of care and the question of reasonable
reliance. See Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule lob-5: Should Careless
Plaintiffs be Denied Recovery?, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 96, 101 & n.22 (1985). The duty of
care is an element in determining whether a particular plaintiff should be allowed to
recover. See Wheeler, supra note 34, at 592. The plaintiff will be denied recovery for lack
of due diligence if he disregards a risk known to him or if the risk is so obvious that he
should have been aware of it. The risk must be so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would result. See Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1156 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1120 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing W. Prosser, Torts § 34, at
185 (4th ed. 1971)), cert denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977)). Due diligence has been applied as
a standard for evaluating a plaintiff's right to recover in a churning action. See Petrites v.
J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977) (only those who have
1986] 1107
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
conduct that will fulfill the plaintiff's duty of due diligence39 and on
whether such an inquiry is properly an element of the prima facie case40
or an affirmative defense.4 These disagreements should be evaluated
under the two prong standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Bate-
man Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner.42 Under the first prong, the
court must determine that the plaintiff's culpability at least equals the
defendant's before it may serve to preclude recovery under Rule lOb-5.43
The second prong requires a finding that precluding the suit will not sig-
nificantly interfere with the protection of the investing public and the
enforcement of the securities laws."
This Note proposes a new framework for analyzing Rule lOb-5 churn-
ing actions in nondiscretionary accounts that will reduce the confusion
currently faced by brokers and investors. Part I discusses the proper ele-
ments of the plaintiff's prima facie case, distinguishing between factors
that determine excessive trading and those that determine scienter. It
then argues that both the legislative history of the 1934 Act and Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) policy indicate that actual reliance
should be sufficient to prove broker control. Part II argues that the cus-
tomer's conduct in supervising his account should be evaluated by a com-
parative culpability standard, and will suggest factors that indicate such
culpability. It argues that under Bateman, both the structure of the stat-
ute and policy considerations suggest that an inquiry into the customer's
capacity to evaluate broker's recommendations is only appropriate as an
affirmative defense.
I. THE PROPER CHURNING INQUIRY
Churning is considered a manipulative or deceptive device; it therefore
pursued their interests with care and good faith should recover under 10b-5), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
39. The Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits measure the duty of care by a
recklessness standard. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983);
Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1156 (5th Cir. 1981); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615
F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Fried-
lander v. Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.
1985).
The Third Circuit applies a reasonableness standard. See Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 194 (3d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff fails to meet duty of due diligence
when he acts unreasonably), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff must act reasonably).
40. See Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1156 (5th Cir. 1981); Holdsworth v. Strong,
545 F.2d 687, 696 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); see also Mallis v.
Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff only required to prove he was
not reckless when defendant put it at issue), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981).
41. See J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American Appraisal Assocs., 628 F.2d 994, 998-99 (7th
Cir. 1980); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976).
42. 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
43. See id. at 2629.
44. See id.
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violates section 10(b), the anti-fraud provision of the 1934 Act, and Rule
lOb-5.4 In a churning action, the inquiry should focus on three issues:
first, whether the account was excessively traded, thus causing an in-
jury;46 second, whether the broker acted with scienter, which establishes
whether the trading was for the purpose of generating commissions;4'
third, whether the customer relied on the broker, which in a nondiscre-
tionary account establishes whether the broker controlled the account.48
A. Excessive Trading
Whether the customer's account was excessively traded establishes
whether an injury has occurred49 and should be determined by a three
step inquiry. First the customer's goals and financial resources must be
determined.5" Once the customer's investment goals and resources are
determined, objective measures should be used to quantify the volume of
trading in the account.5" The trier of fact should then compare these
measures with the customer's objectives and resources to determine
whether the account has been traded excessively. 2
The inquiry into the customer's investment goals should not focus on
the customer's intelligence, education or securities trading background5 3
because the customer's ultimate investment goal,' and not his capacity
45. See Leib v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 952
(E.D. Mich. 1978).
46. See infra Part I.A.
47. See infra Part I.B.
48. See infra Part I.C.
49. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1981) (investor
harmed by excessive trading in two ways: decline in the value of his portfolio and amount
of commissions generated); E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945) (exces-
sive trading generates profits for brokers).
50. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
51. These measures include the turnover rate, the frequency of in and out trading and
the commission ratio. See Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975)
("hallmarks [of churning] are disproportionate turnover, frequent in and out trading, and
large brokerage commissions"). See supra note 9.
Churning is not localized to a single transaction or group of transactions. An excessive
aggregation of transactions constitutes the offense. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637
F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1974).
Therefore, a finding of churning can only be based on a hindsight analysis of the history
of the account. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 327. Thus, the inquiry into whether the account
was excessively traded should be restricted to those measures that relate to the overall
pattern of trading and not to single transactions or limited groups of trades.
52. See Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 (1st Cir.) (volume of
trading that might suffice to prove excessive trading in account where investment aims
were solely to produce dividend income and conserve principle was insufficient to prove
churning in trading account), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); 1 S. Goldberg, supra
note 1, § 3.2[a][1], at 3-7 to -9 (same).
53. But see Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1974); Russo v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 613, 617 (N.D. IM. 1982).
54. An investor's goals may be aggressive or speculative, which would necessitate
active trading, or may be conservative or circumspect, which would require fewer trades.
See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983).
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to plan investment strategies, 55 should be considered when determining
the appropriate level of trading in the account. This is because churning
frequently occurs when novice investors want to enter a profitable mar-
ket.5 6 By eliminating the inquiry into the customer's capacity to plan his
investment strategies, disillusioned investors will properly be prevented
from using their naivete as a sword against brokers who were merely
pursuing their customer's investment goals.
57
B. Scienter
Scienter refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipu-
late or defraud. 8 In a churning action proof of scienter establishes that
the broker caused the excessive trading for the purpose of generating
commissions. Objective measures59 are useful in determining the bro-
ker's motivation.' When the broker influences trading decisions these
measures can support a finding of reckless disregard for the customer's
interest.61
The trier of fact should then consider the specific trades and trading
strategies recommended by the broker to determine whether the transac-
tions involved could be justified for reasons other than to generate com-
missions.62 For example, if the broker has induced switching between
securities,63 an analysis of the number of switches and the overall profit
55. Strategies-the means of implementing an investment goal-may be character-
ized as sophisticated. See Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1985)
(dictum) (customer's account reflected sophisticated market maneuvers such as spreads
and straddles).
56. S. Jaffe, Broker-Dealers and Securities Markets: A Guide to the Regulatory Pro-
cess § 15.04, at 314-15 (1977) (churning most often occurs in late stages of bull markets
when there is a general increase in the volume of transactions and an influx of novice
investors).
57. See Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 718-20,
69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 242-43 (1968) (dictum) ("sweet trusting widow" claiming conservative
objectives may have asked for speculative recommendations); S. Jaffe, supra note 56,
§ 15.04, at 314 (courts are faced with factual problem of deciding if unsophisticated in-
vestor is simply greedy).
58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
59. These include the commission ratio and the percentage of the broker's total earn-
ings derived from the account. See supra note 9.
60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
61. See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (if high percentage of broker's total income was earned in commissions from ac-
count, court may infer scienter), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977); Marshak v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 380 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (comparison of size of
broker's commission with customer's equity demonstrates broker's purpose to generate
commissions).
62. See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1502 (1lth Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's expert testified
that velocity of trading made no sense except to generate commissions).
63. Switching between securities is a form of in and out trading, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text, in which, for example, the broker convinces the customer to sell se-
curity A, with a value of $5000 and purchase security B, also valued at $5000. The
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can provide evidence of recklessness when the customer's profit has been
substantially eroded by commissions.M Absent a reasonable explana-
tion,65 if the broker has recommended a purchase and shortly thereafter
recommends a sale, or engages in multiple trading,66 the transaction can
provide evidence of a purpose to generate commissions. A few unjusti-
fied trades may merely indicate negligence, which is insufficient to sup-
port a claim of churning.67 As the number increases, a higher degree of
culpability may be inferred.68 The percentage of poor quality recommen-
dations will also serve as a guide in determining scienter. When the per-
centage is high, intent or reckless disregard may be inferred,6 9 while a
small percentage of such transactions may indicate only negligence.7 °
Factors such as cross-trading,7' misrepresentation7 or unauthorized
trading,73 which either have no reasonable investment justification or are
wrongful in themselves, should be considered strong evidence of scienter.
Conversely, if the broker has widely published his recommendations, or
engaged in many transactions that do not generate commissions, or has
generally recommended investment in high caliber securities, these fac-
tors may negate a charge of recklessness.7 4
C. Control
In determining whether the broker exercised sufficient control over a
broker earns commissions on both the sale and the purchase. The SEC considers this a
single transaction. See Grubbs. 28 S.E.C. 323, 326 (1948); 1 S. Goldberg, supra note 1,
§ 2.9[c][3], at 2-66 to -67.
64. See Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1204 & n.12
(8th Cir. 1982) (churning found when, inter alia, customer's profits were exceeded by
broker's profits); see also N. Poser, supra note 1, at 583 (same).
65. See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (in typical churning case broker can offer no explanation or justification for his
trading), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977); S. Jaffe, supra note 56, at 311.
66. See supra note 9.
67. See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (it is not "the purpose of the securities laws to guard against improvident or even
negligent actions of [brokers]"), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
68. See RH. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 474 (1955) (82% of purchases reversed in
one year indicative of excessive trading with purpose to generate commissions), aff'd per
curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
69. See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D. Va. 1968)
(investments constituting 22% of portfolio in poor quality stocks indicate indiscriminate
trading).
70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 9.
72. Broker misrepresentation is expressly prohibited by Rule lOb-5, which states: "It
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly. . . .[t]o make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact ... " 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1985).
73. Unauthorized trading occurs when a broker initiates transactions in a customer's
nondiscretionary account without prior approval by the customer. See Marshak v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 381 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
74. See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
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nondiscretionary account, the trier of fact should be limited to consider-
ing whether a substantial majority of trades were initiated on the broker's
recommendation.75 Proof of broker control over the account is necessary
to establish the causal connection between the broker's actions and the
plaintiff's losses.76 Thus, actual reliance, and not the reasonableness of
that reliance, is the key.77 Analysis of the Securities Act of 193378 and
the 1934 Act79 indicates that actual reliance should be sufficient to
demonstrate the causal connection between defendant's actions and
plaintiff's injury.80
75. When the customer initiates a majority or a substantial minority of the trades, his
dependence on the broker is insufficient to justify the presumption that he relied on the
broker to act as an investment counselor and not as an order-taker. See Churning, supra
note 9, at 870 (dealer not in control of account when he is merely a conduit for cus-
tomer's orders).
76. Cf Levinson v. Basic Inc., Nos. 84-3730, 84-3775, 84-3776, slip op. at 16 (6th Cir.
Mar. 27, 1986) ("[r]eliance is the element of a Rule lb-5 action that establishes the
causal nexus between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injuries.");
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 1981) (in misrepresentation case
under Rule lOb-5, court held that reliance is aspect of requirement that losses be causally
connected to defendant's wrongful acts), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). Reliance is a
determination whether the plaintiff was in fact influenced in his trading decisions by the
defendant's statements. Reasonable reliance is a determination whether that plaintiff
should have been influenced. See, Wheeler, supra note 34, at 592-93.
77. See Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[Ihe
requisite degree of control is met when the client routinely follows the recommendations
of the broker.").
78. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)).
79. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1982)).
80. In enacting the federal securities acts, Congress intended to protect the investing
public. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7689, 78 Cong. Rec. 7702 (Presi-
dent's Message and Letter) (1934 Act is one step in broad purpose of protecting inves-
tors), reprinted in 4 Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 7689 at 7702 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Legislative History]; 78 Cong. Rec. 7947 (1934) (statement of Rep. Fish) (pur-
poses of bill include, inter alia, protection of investors and prevention of manipulation),
reprinted in 4 Legislative History, supra, at 7947. Congress also intended to restore inves-
tor confidence, see 78 Cong. Rec. 7689 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Sabath), reprinted in 4
Legislative History, supra, at 7689, and provide for a fair and honest market place for the
sale of securities. See 78 Cong. Rec. 7922 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Mapes), reprinted in 4
Legislative History, supra, at 7922. Although there is little mention of § 10(b) in either
the floor debates or the house hearings, see 1 A. Bromberg, supra note 6, § 2.2(330), at
2:20-:21; Sachs, supra note 37, at 120, the Supreme Court has used general legislative
policy statements as a guide to the 1934 Act's interpretation. See Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (1933 Act legislative history used to interpret
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 action). This has been justified by the view that Congress in-
tended the statute to be construed cumulatively. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 383-87 & n.23 (1983). In the House Report on the 1934 Act, the legislature
recognized that restoring investor confidence in a complex society required the investing
public to trust others regarding their financial affairs and noted its intention to restore
investor confidence by extending the legal concept of the fiduciary relationship. See
House Consideration, Amendment and Passage of H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78
Cong. Rec. 7703, reprinted in 4 Legislative History, supra, at 7703.
Legislative intent to expand the scope of this relationship is further evidenced by the
emphasis on investor protection and the substitution of high business ethics for the rule of
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Reliance on a broker's recommendations should be presumed in some
circumstances as a consequence of the broker's responsibility to the client
under normative rules." According to these rules the broker implicitly
caveat emptor. See Message from the President-Regulation of Securities Issues, 77 Cong.
Rec. 937, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra, at 937 (proposal adds to the rule of
caveat emptor, "let the seller also beware"). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
message as indicating that a fundamental purpose of federal securities regulation is "to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor, and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." See SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
It has been noted that the legislature was willing to accept an increased potential for
strike suits as the price for removing common law barriers to proving fraud. See Douglas
& Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 174 (1933) (commentary on
1933 Act by William 0. Douglas, one of bill's drafters).
The purpose of § 10(b), as expressed in the language of the statute, is "for the protec-
tion of investors" from "any manipulative or deceptive device." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982). The persistent use of inclusive language, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-51 (1972) (acts proscribed by § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "are broad
and, by repeated use of the word 'any,' are obviously meant to be inclusive"), suggests
that Congress intended the guarantees of fair dealing in securities to be applied equally to
all investors, without regard for their capacity.
81. Section 10(b) grants the SEC the power to promulgate rules to prevent fraud. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). In defining the responsibility the broker has toward his client, the
SEC has adopted the "shingle theory." See 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 6, § 5.7(214), at
5:48; Churning, supra note 9, at 870. Under this theory, brokers impliedly represent that
their customer will be served fairly, according to the standards of the profession. See
E.H. Rollins & Sons, 18 S.E.C. 347, 362 (1945); Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388
(1939).
Section 15(b)(8) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (Supp. 1982), requires all bro-
kers to be members of a qualifying self-regulatory agency. These include the NASD,
which is a self-regulatory organization registered under § 15a of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (1982). See T. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 259-60 (1985). Its mem-
bers include all broker-dealers doing substantial retail business. See id. Another qualify-
ing agency is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which is a self-regulatory agency
registered under § 6 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1982). See T. Hazen, supra, at 259-
60. Its members may also be members of the NASD. Id. at 260.
Both the NASD and the NYSE have promulgated rules of conduct for their members.
See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) 2001 (Feb. 1986); NYSE
Rules of Operation of Member Organizations, 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2325 (July 1983).
Although violations of these rules do not create liability absent fraud, see Van Alen v.
Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547
(2d Cir. 1977) (no liability under NYSE Rules absent proof of fraud); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (no liability under NASD art. III,
§ 2 absent proof of fraud), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), they
serve as standards of the profession. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333
(5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980).
Two rules are particularly relevant to churning. One is the NYSE "know your cus-
tomer" rule:
Every member organization is required through a general partner, a principal
executive officer or a person or persons... to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer,
every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organi-
zation and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted
or carried by such organization.
NYSE Rule 405, 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2405, at 3697 (March 1982).
The other is the "suitability" rule, which reads:
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represents that he has a reasonable basis for any recommendations
made, 2 that he is aware of how his past trades have affected the cus-
tomer's account,83 and that he has reasonable grounds for believing his
recommendations are suitable for the customer based on facts such as the
customer's other security holdings and his financial status and needs.
84
As a result, when the broker makes recommendations, the presumption
should be that the customer relied on them.8" Only when the broker acts
merely as an order taker should the customer be presumed not to rely on
the broker.8 6
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security,
a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation
is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by
such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation
and needs.
NASD-Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2152, at 2051 (Feb.
1986).
82. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer &
Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975).
83. The NYSE "know your customer" rule places an affirmative duty on the broker
to make reasonable efforts to learn essential facts relative to every customer and every
order. See Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 718, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222, 241 (1968) (when customer follows broker's recommendations there
should be obligation on part of broker to determine customer's actual financial situation
and needs); 1 S. Goldberg, supra note 1, § 3.3[b], at 3-33 (broker under affirmative duty
to acquire facts about customer). The rule specifies that its scope includes "every cus-
tomer, every order, every cash or margin account. . . ." NYSE Rule 405, 2 NYSE
Guide (CCH) V 2405, at 3697 (Mar. 1982). The use of the word "every" suggests that the
broker must make a reasonable inquiry into the customer's financial situation at the com-
mencement of the relationship.
As this duty extends to every order, the broker should be aware of how previous trades
have affected the investor's situation. Because the broker will have copies of any confir-
mation slips and monthly statements supplied to the customer, his affirmative duty to
learn essential facts about the customer suggests that the broker should be charged with
constructive knowledge of changes in the investor's financial position.
84. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, NASD Manual (CCH) % 2152, at 2051
(Feb. 1986). Although the suitability doctrine is generally applied to evaluate the quality
of single trades, see Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.
1983) (churning requires the plaintiff to show quantity of trades was inappropriate; an
unsuitability claim requires the plaintiff to show that quality of stocks was inappropriate),
at least one court and one commentator have recognized that excessive trading must be
gauged by the level of activity suitable to the customer's account. See Miley v. Oppen-
heimer, 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981); 1 S. Goldberg, supra note 1, ch. I, at 1-7
(churning may be thought of as quantitative unsuitability). Excessive trading and the
recommendation of the purchase or continuing purchase of securities that are beyond the
customer's financial capacity violate the suitability rule. See Policy of the Board of Gov-
ernors, Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, NASD Manual (CCH) 2152, at 2051-52
(Feb. 1986).
85. The suitability rule may shift responsibility for making inappropriate investment
decisions from the customer to the broker. See Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities
of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 Duke L.J. 445, 449-50.
86. See id. at 450. NYSE Rule 405 imposes constructive notice on the broker when
trading in the account is approaching an excessive level. 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2405,
at 3697 (Mar. 1982). At this point, if the broker continues to make recommendations
that induce trading, such recommendations are inappropriate to the needs of the cus-
tomer, and should constitute a violation of the suitability rule.
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This presumption was acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit in Follans-
bee v. Davis Skaggs & Co. 7 In Follansbee, the court noted that the so-
phisticated investor can be expected to be influenced by the broker's
greater access to financial information, and can further be expected either
to accept the recommendation or disassociate himself from the broker."8
The court concluded, however, that routine reliance by the sophisticated
customer is not sufficient to satisfy the control element.8 9 This conclu-
sion was improper because the issue is reliance, not reasonableness. If
the substantial majority of trades were made pursuant to the broker's
recommendations, a causal connection sufficient to satisfy the customer's
burden of proving actual reliance, and therefore control,90 should be
found.
II. THE INQUIRY INTO THE PLAINTIFF'S DUTY OF DILIGENCE AND
THE BATEMAN STANDARD
Although not expressly recognized by the courts, the inquiry into the
customer's capacity to make informed investment decisions should prop-
erly be considered an inquiry into whether the customer has met the gen-
eral Rule lOb-5 requirement of due diligence.91 This requirement
imposes on a plaintiff the duty to take reasonable steps to protect his
interests and to exercise good judgment in making investment decisons.92
It arises from the belief that a person who is partially responsible for his
own injury should not shift his loss to another.93
Although courts properly require proof of broker control as part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case,94 courts often include as part of the control
element an inquiry into the customer's sophistication.95 The plaintiff's
87. 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982).
88. See id. at 677; see also Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 951, 956 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (a customer normally depends on his broker for infor-
mation, advice and recommendations).
89. Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677.
90. See Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) (control
exists when customer routinely follows broker's recommendations). Commentators have
termed the customer's routine reliance on broker's recommendations as "direct" and
"objective" evidence of broker control. See 1 S. Goldberg, supra note 1, § 2.8o[], at 2-
30 ("objective" evidence); Churning, supra note 9, at 871 ("direct" evidence).
91. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
92. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977) (only those who have
pursued their interests with care and good faith should recover under l0b-5), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1978). See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
93. See Diligence, supra note 37, at 905.
94. See, eg., Tieman v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter
& Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
95. See eg., Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 644-45, 648-49 (3rd Cir. 1985)
(jury instruction mandating consideration of, inter alia, customer sophistication, trading
experience and percentage of trades entered into on broker recommendation focuses jury
attention on plaintiff's capacity); Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1983) (customer's routine reliance on broker's recommendations, his sophistica-
tion on securities matters and his independent evaluation are equal considerations in de-
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duty to exercise due diligence is thus made part of the prima facie case.96
Courts disagree on the standard of conduct applicable to the general in-
quiry into the plaintiff's duty of due diligence,97 and on whether such an
inquiry is properly an element of the prima facie case98 or an affirmative
defense.99 These disagreements must be evaluated under the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner.' 0
In Bateman, the Court considered the validity of the in pan delicto
defense' 0 1 to a Rule lOb-5 action."0 2 The Court held that such a defense
was not available under the Rule.' The Court established a two prong
test to determine when a plaintiff's culpability may preclude recovery
under Rule 1Ob-5.'" The first prong requires that the plaintiff be at least
as culpable as the defendant.' 0 5 The second prong bars recovery only if
to do so "would not significantly interfere with the effective enforcement
of the securities laws and protection of the investing public."'0 6
A. The Appropriate Standard for the Plaintiffs Duty of Due Diligence
Under Bateman, 07 the plaintiff's recovery may be barred only if he
termining if customer retained control of account); Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711
F.2d 1361, 1368 n.8 (7th Cir. 1983) (customer's business sophistication is consideration
bearing on control); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982)
(if customer is fully able to evaluate his broker's advice and agrees with broker's recom-
mendations, customer retains control of account); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563
F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Carras v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) (same).
96. The due diligence doctrine was initially incorporated into lob-5 actions as an
analog to the contributory negligence defense, see Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687,
692 (10th Cir. 1976) (discussing original reason for considering due diligence in lOb-5
action), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977), on the theory that such a defense was appropri-
ate when mere negligence could create broker liability. See id. at 692-93. Following
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), courts have reaffirmed the validity of
the due diligence inquiry, but have held that a negligence standard is no longer appropri-
ate. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1977)
(negligence standard for due diligence no longer appropriate), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977) (when defendant's liability
is premised on his intentional misconduct, evaluation of plaintiff's conduct against negli-
gence standard is irrational), (citing Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.
1976) (to offset intentional fraud, plaintiff's conduct must be somewhat comparable to
that of the defendant's), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977)) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1978).
97. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
100. 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
101. The in pari delicto defense provides that in cases of equal or mutual fault, the
defending party's position is the better one. Id. at 2626.
102. See id. at 2624, 2629-30.
103. See id. at 2628-29.
104. See id. at 2629.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
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bears substantially the same responsibility for the violation as the defend-
ant.1"8 A defendant in a churning action under Rule lOb-5 may be found
liable only for intentional, willful or reckless conduct." 9 Because the
fault of the plaintiff must involve gross conduct comparable to that of the
defendant, ° the plaintiff must have behaved at least recklessly to pre-
clude recovery. Negligence alone is not enough. I
The equivalence of the control inquiry in a churning action to the gen-
eral Rule lOb-5 due diligence requirement" 2 suggests that the factors
currently used to determine customer control of the account should be
applied when evaluating customer culpability. Because churning is fact
specific"' a universal standard for recklessness is inappropriate." 4 An
appropriate consideration"' is whether the plaintiff had the capacity to
evaluate the broker's recommendations." 6 This involves analysis of the
plaintiff's education, intelligence, prior business and investing experi-
ence 1 7 and the time that the plaintiff had to devote to the account.I "
Absent such a capacity, there should be a presumption that the customer
was not reckless." 9 This presumption, however, should be rebuttable.12 0
108. See id. at 2629.
109. See Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); M & B
Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Van Alen v.
Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547
(2d Cir. 1977).
110. Cf. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976) (in misrepresenta-
tion case under Rule lOb-5, court stated that "[i]f contributory fault of plaintiff is to
cancel out wanton or intentional fraud, it ought to be gross conduct somewhat compara-
ble to that of defendant").
111. Cf. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1122 (5th
Cir. 1980) (action for manipulation of stock prices).
112. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
113. See Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L
Rep. (CCH) 22,417, at 29,866 (C.F.T.C. 1984) (churning determined by reference to
the specific circumstances of the broker-customer relationship).
114. Cf. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977) (diligence in lOb-5
cases judged by subjective standard), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1978); Friedlander v.
Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (due diligence standard is flexible and
based on attributes of particular plaintiff), aff'd, 755 F.2d 810 (1 th Cir. 1985); Diligence,
supra note 37, at 920 (standard for plaintiff's conduct should be subjective).
115. Because a finding of investor recklessness rests on specific facts and circumstances
surrounding the account, see supra note 113 and accompanying text, the following listing
in the text is merely intended to suggest factors that might be examined and not to ex-
haust all possible factors.
116. Cf. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982) (touch-
stone of inquiry is plaintiff's intelligence and understanding).
117. Cf. M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(indicia of control include intelligence, education and investment and business experience
of customer).
118. See Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff
not reckless because nature of his occupation made it difficult for him to closely supervise
business affairs).
119. Cf. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975) (customer's lack of capac-
ity may itself give rise to an inference of broker control).
120. Cf Mundheim, supra note 85, at 450 (under suitability doctrine, presumption of
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Similarly, an ongoing or close personal relationship between the cus-
tomer and the broker should raise the presumption that the customer
was not reckless because the closeness of the relationship might tend to
dissipate the customer's natural wariness. 121 Conversely, a customer
who has initiated a significant percentage of trades, rejected the broker's
advice not to trade or misrepresented his financial condition to induce
the broker to handle a transaction may be found to have been reckless. 1
22
If a sophisticated investor actively monitored his account or sought in-
formation in addition to that provided by the broker, subsequent acquies-
cence in the broker's recommendations should be considered reckless. 123
B. Plaintiffs Reckless Conduct as an Affirmative Defense to a
Churning Action
In Bateman124 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's culpability
may bar recovery in a Rule 1Ob-5 action only when the denial of recovery
does not significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of the se-
curities laws or the protection of the investing public. 2 5 Under this stan-
dard inquiry into a customer's responsibility for churning in his account
should only be appropriate as part of an affirmative defense based on the
customer's failure to exercise due diligence. To hold otherwise would
significantly interfere with enforcement of the securities laws and the
protection of the investing public.
When examining the customer's diligence in evaluating a broker's rec-
ommendations, two distinct questions are presented. First, did the de-
fendant actually violate Rule lOb-5? Second, should this specific plaintiff
be denied recovery in spite of the violation?' 26 Restricting consideration
of the customer's sophistication-and therefore his ability to exercise due
broker responsibility for inappropriate trading based on his recommendations is
rebuttable).
121. Cf. M & B Contracting Corp. v. Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(indicia of control include whether broker-customer relationship was "arms length" or
"particularly close"); E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 354 (1945) (relationship
between parties may cause normal customer wariness to be dissipated).
122. Cf. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
who rejected broker's caution against purchasing limited partnership interest and falsified
statement of marginal tax bracket to prevail on broker to handle transactions found in
control of account); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977)
(defendant's contention that sophisticated plaintiff initiated as many trades as broker con-
sidered relevant in finding of customer control), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1977).
123. Cf. Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon, & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983) (so-
phisticated customer who monitors account may retain control over it). A sophisticated
investor having access to information other than the broker's recommendations and rea-
sonable time in which to consider it, and who demonstrates willingness to reject or initate
trades, but nevertheless repeatedly acquiesces in broker's recommendations may be de-
nied recovery on the grounds of recklessness. Cf. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681
F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1982) (sophisticated customer who acquieses in broker's rec-
ommendations despite independent investigation found to retain control of account).
124. 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
125. See id. at 2629.
126. See Diligence, supra note 37, at 923.
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diligence in detecting fraud 27-to the broker's affirmative defense clari-
fies this distinction. The guilty broker who is not liable merely because
his customer's actions barred recovery is distinguished from the broker
who did not violate the securities laws. 128 Because instances of broker
fraud are exposed even though the plaintiff's lack of due care denied him
money damages, the SEC is better able to take action against the guilty
broker.'29 When the plaintiff's due diligence is treated as part of his
prima facie case, this distinction is lost.
Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile the inquiry into customer so-
phistication as part of a prima facie case with section 29(a)"'3 of the 1934
Act. Section 29(a) voids any agreement binding a party to waive compli-
ance with the 1934 Act,"' and apparently extends its protection even to
the sophisticated investor.'3 2 Thus, Congress has decided to protect even
those investors who intentionally waive the protection of the 1934 Act. 3
It is unlikely Congress also believed it more important to penalize care-
less investors than to prosecute securities act violators. Treating cus-
tomer sophistication as part of the prima facie case in a churning action
hampers enforcement by shifting the focus of the inquiry from the de-
fendant's fraud to the plaintiff's capacity to detect fraud. It is probable
that Congress would have rejected such an inquiry as part of the plain-
tiff's prima facie case had it expressly considered statutory regulation of
127. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
128. Cf. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir. 1977) ("dispositive element in
[10b-5 action] is that the defendant owes a duty of full and fair disclosure to the public,
[and] not to any particular investor. Whether a private plaintiff might be precluded from
recovery, then, need not alter the distinct consideration whether a defendant has violated
duties imposed by the Act."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1978); Diligence, supra note 37,
at 923 (instances in which defendant found innocent distinguished from those in which
plaintiff's conduct bars recovery).
129. Private actions under Rule lOb-5 are allowed as a supplement SEC enforcement
of the 1934 Act. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)
(citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
Although there has been an increase in churning over the past three years, the SEC has
taken a less active role in prosecuting these cases because it lacks manpower to scrutinize
daily trading. See G. Morgenston, The Leaky Umbrella That is the SEC, Money, Nov.,
1985 226, 234. However, brokers are required to state whether or not they have ever
been found liable for any securities law violation on their registration application. See
Form BD, 3 Federal Securities Laws, Regulations and Forms (CCH) 1 33,401 at 33,281
(Mar. 1986). Thus, by clarifying when a broker has violated Rule lOb-5, this shift will
increase the possibility of effective enforcement.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
131. See id. This section reads:
(a) Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder,
or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.
Id
132. The use of the term "any person" indicates that Congress did not intend to ex-
empt sophisticated investors from this section's protection. See Sachs, supra note 37, at
126 & n.234.
133. See id. at 127. The section does so by specifically allowing even waived claims to
be prosecuted. See id. at 127-28.
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churning. 134
Several policy grounds have been used to justify the inquiry into a
customer's due diligence in detecting fraud. 35 These include deterring
investor carelessness,1 36 promoting anti-fraud policies,1 37 promoting fair-
ness,138 curbing excessive speculation, 139 ensuring a causal link between
the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's injury, 40 and protecting brokers
from becoming insurers of their recommendations.' 4 ' The following ex-
amination of these policies indicates that the issue whether the plaintiff
has met the duty of due diligence should be considered only as an affirm-
ative defense to broker liability.
Nothing in the history of the 1934 Act suggests that Congress intended
to penalize investor carelessness. 42 The 1934 Act itself demonstrates
legislative preference for penalizing perpetrators of fraud, not its vic-
tims. 4 3 This policy does not, therefore, justify impeding enforcement of
the 1934 Act by including the due diligence inquiry in the prima facie
case.
Although the suggestion that investor wariness will promote anti-
fraud policies is plausible, it should not justify a rule of law that may
mask the broker's violation of the Act. Moreover, when there has been
customer carelessness and the account has been traded excessively, the
duty of care is apparently ineffective in preventing the fraud. Because
Congress viewed penalizing fraudulent broker practices as the most effec-
tive means of preventing fraud,'" the goal of promoting customer vigi-
134. Cf id. at 129 (§ 29 suggests that had Congress considered private actions under
§ 10(b) it would have rejected duty of care).
135. See generally id. at 130 (listing policy considerations supporting plaintiff's duty of
due care).
136. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976).
137. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
138. See id.
139. See Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(broker not liable for failing to stop plaintiff's irresponsible trading as this would en-
courage customer to take even greater risks).
140. See Sachs, supra note 37, at 132.
141. See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (Rule lOb-5 not intended to remedy all losses resulting from brokers' recommenda-
tions), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
142. The legislative history makes no mention of the goal of avoiding investor careless-
ness. See Sachs, supra note 37, at 131. Rather it refers to the goal of substituting a high
level of business morality for the harsh rule of caveat emptor. See supra note 80. This
suggests that Congress wished to reduce, rather than increase, the burden of watchfulness
required of the investor. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir.)
("rule of caveat emptor should not be relied on to reward fraud and deception") (quoting
FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937)), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1943).
143. Section 10(b) empowers the commission to prescribe rules that are "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. §78j(b)
(1982) (emphasis added).
144. See House Consideration, Amendment & Passage of H.R. 9323, 78 Cong. Rec.
7862, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 7862 (remarks of Rep. Lea) (this bill proposes to punish persons
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lance should not restrict enforcement of the Act.
"Fairness" is said to require a duty of care that limits access to Rule
lOb-5 to "those who have pursued their own interests with care and good
faith." 145 Because fairness requires penalizing the more blameworthy
wrongdoer despite the negligence of his victim, it also requires an estima-
tion of the relative blame accorded to the broker and the customer.1 46 If
the customer must prove his lack of fault as an element of his prima facie
churning case, the trier of fact may never get to evaluate the fault attribu-
table to the broker. Thus, fairness is better served if the customer's duty
of care is treated as an affirmative defense in order to ensure that the
blameworthiness of the broker will always be considered.
At least one court has suggested that the elimination of a due care
requirement will lead to excessive speculation. 47 Although Congress
was concerned with curbing such speculation, the legislative history of
the 1934 Act indicates that this concern was subordinated to investor
protection. 4 ' By defining the duty of due care as an affirmative defense,
the plaintiff's conduct will still be considered, and therefore the curb on
speculation is subordinated to investor protection, but is not eliminated.
Next, although proof of causation is necessary for recovery, such a
connection does not require proof of due diligence.' 49 Actual reliance
can establish this causal connection.' 50
Finally, one court has expressed concern that if no inquiry is made
into customer sophistication, brokers will, in effect, become insurers of
their recommendations.' 5 ' The analysis posited by this Note does not,
however, call for eliminating this inquiry, but rather shifts the burden of
proof. The broker will remain protected both by the scienter require-
ment and by the defense that the customer's culpability outweighs his
own.
CONCLUSION
An inquiry into a customer's capacity to evaluate a broker's recom-
mendation is an inappropriate element of the plaintiff's prima facie case
in a churning action involving a nondiscretionary account. Because this
guilty of fraud), reprinted in 4 Legislative History, supra note 80, at 7862-63; Sachs, supra
note 37, at 131.
145. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977) cerL denied 434 U.S. 911
(1978). See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. In his letter to Congress requesting the legislation that became the 1934 Act,
President Roosevelt asked for legislation "for the protection of investors, for the safe-
guarding of values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary,
unwise, and destructive speculation." H.R. No. 1384, 78 Cong. Rec. 7702, 73 Cong., 2d
Sess. (President's message and letter), reprinted in 4 Legislative History, supra note 80, at
7702.
149. See Sachs, supra note 37 at 132.
150. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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capacity reflects only the customer's ability to be diligent in detecting
churning, and is not relevant to the issues of broker control of the cus-
tomer's account, excessive trading of that account or the broker's scien-
ter in making trading decisions, the inquiry into the capacity question
should be restricted to the broker's affirmative defense. Moreover, shift-
ing the burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant will add an additional
measure of protection to the customer because the SEC will be better
able to penalize violators of the 1934 Act. Under the standards an-
nounced in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, I" in which a
plaintiff's culpability in Rule lOb-5 actions may bar recovery only when
it is substantially equivalent to the defendant's, the requisite weighing of
culpability can best occur when the customer's sophistication and dili-
gence in detecting fraud are viewed as elements of an affirmative defense.
Michael Slonim
152. 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
